Date: Thursday 10 - Friday 11 December 2026
Convenor: EU*Asia Institute at ESSCA School of Management
Venue: ESSCA Campus Lyon (4 pont Pasteur) & Online via TEAMS
The call for submissions is now closed. The programme will be published shortly.
AIMS AND RATIONALE
The contemporary world order is being reshaped by geopolitical ruptures that expose how globalisation actually works — and for whom. Recent geopolitical tensions have led governments to reassess the balance between economic efficiency, resilience, and strategic autonomy.
As a result, established patterns of international specialization and global value chain integration are increasingly being reconsidered through the lens of economic security and national sovereignty. Trade conflicts between the major powers mark the shift from geopolitics to geoeconomics that Luttwak (1990) announced, and Hirschman (1945) anticipated: economic interdependence is not only a source of mutual gains but also an instrument of power. The networks of trade, finance and data that once symbolised open markets have become arenas of coercion in their own right (Farrell and Newman, 2019).
Another relevant issue is the challenges that countries face regarding their sovereignty, particularly in relation to artificial intelligence, which has the power to alter a country's economic and military strength and productivity.
Artificial intelligence sharpens these dynamics: it can shift the economic and military balance between states, and its preconditions are strikingly material.
The first concerns the sovereignty of states in relation to energy supply. Access to inexpensive, low-emission electricity could provide countries with a considerable competitive advantage. Consequently, electricity infrastructure has become a cornerstone of geoeconomic power.
The second relates to data sovereignty. This issue is closely connected to the presence of data centres, which can strengthen a country's control over how data is accessed, stored and processed (De Roucy-Rochegonde and Buffard, 2025).
The third concerns sovereignty over computing infrastructure. This includes access to advanced computing resources, artificial intelligence technologies and the software tools required to develop and deploy AI. These resources are becoming key determinants of national capability — yet much of this infrastructure is owned and operated by a handful of private firms, which raises the question of who actually exercises the sovereignty that states claim.
Another related issue is access to rare earth elements, critical minerals and semiconductor chips. They have become strategic assets, with China holding a clear advantage in market share (Siddiqui, 2025), while the ecological and social costs of their extraction are distributed highly unevenly. Circular-economy strategies could ease the pressure on primary supply but only through international cooperation (Wang et al., 2024).
These developments further reinforce the strategic importance of controlling the resources and infrastructure required for the development and deployment of artificial intelligence.
WORKSHOP
The workshop therefore examines current challenges to the sovereignty of states and regions (I); control over the resources and infrastructure required to develop and deploy AI, including how that control is divided between states and private actors (II); trade and industrial policy as instruments of strategic sovereignty (III); and the scope for international collaboration in key technological areas (IV).
In doing so, it seeks to advance a multidisciplinary understanding of the geopolitical and geoeconomic transformations reshaping the global economy and the governance of emerging technologies.
We are looking for contributions from scholars and practitioners in the fields of political science, economics, international business, management, law, and related disciplines. Both theoretical and empirical contributions, as well as policy-oriented papers, are welcome.
Contributions should address one of the following or related topics:
- Sovereign AI: national AI strategies, compute capacity, and the geopolitics of data centres, including their energy, water and land requirements;
- The political economy of the AI investment boom: financialisation, market concentration, and macroeconomic risk;
- Semiconductor statecraft: export controls, chip alliances, and supply-chain chokepoints;
- Data sovereignty, cloud dependency and cybersecurity, including Europe's search for digital autonomy;
- Weaponised interdependence: payment infrastructures, currency power, sanctions, and de-dollarisation;
- Economic security and strategic autonomy: concepts, measurement, and the limits of de-risking and decoupling;
- Energy transitions, critical raw materials, and the new resource nationalism — from export restrictions to green extractivism;
- The return of industrial policy: subsidy races, national champions, and the state as investor and shareholder;
- Globalisation, deglobalisation, reglobalisation: fragmentation along geopolitical blocs, connector economies, near-shoring and friend-shoring;
- Trade wars, tariffs, overcapacity, and the "second China shock";
- Multilateral and plurilateral cooperation in the governance of emerging technologies.
Selected contributions may be considered for inclusion in a panel proposal for the 2027 UACES Annual Conference in Bordeaux. Subsequently, we are considering a joint publication of the workshop contributions.
There are no registration fees for this workshop. Venue, lunch and coffee breaks will be covered by ESSCA.




